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Abstract We examine the impact of price, service
quality and information search on people’s propensity to
switch health insurers in the competitive Dutch health
insurance market. Using panel data from annual house-
hold surveys and data on health insurers’ premiums and
quality ratings over the period 2006–2012, we estimate a
random effects logit model of people’s switching deci-
sions. We find that switching propensities depend on
health plan price and quality, and on people’s age,
health, education and having supplementary or group
insurance. Young people (18–35 years) are more sensi-
tive to price, whereas older people are more sensitive to
quality. Searching for health plan information has a
much stronger impact on peoples’ sensitivity to price
than to service quality. In addition, searching for health
plan information has a stronger impact on the switching
propensity of higher than lower educated people, sug-
gesting that higher educated people make better use of
available health plan information. Finally, having sup-
plementary insurance significantly reduces older people’s
switching propensity.
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Introduction
Health care reforms in various countries aim at im-
proving the efficiency of health care delivery by en-
hancing consumer choice. Countries with a social health
insurance system (e.g. Germany, Netherlands, Switzer-
land) focus on giving consumers an annual free choice
of health insurer to motivate health insurers to act as a
prudent buyer of health services on behalf of their en-
rollees [55]. These reforms are based on the theoretical
model of payer-driven managed competition [23]. By
contrast, countries with a national health service (e.g.
England) typically focus on enhancing patient choice of
provider by encouraging patient-driven rather than pay-
er-driven competition [27]. In the US, the dramatic rise
of high deductible, ‘‘consumer-directed’’ health plans is
an important example of the patient-driven approach
[29].
Payer-driven competition reforms rely on adequate
consumer choice of health insurers. Competition among
health insurers can only be effective if consumers are
inclined to search for better and lower-priced insurers. If
consumers do not have the information or ability to
make an adequate choice among health plans, or face
high search or switching costs, insurers may have in-
sufficient incentives to improve efficiency and to ac-
commodate consumer preferences, resulting in a loss of
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welfare [34].1 Furthermore, if the ability to switch to
better health plans varies across different types of con-
sumers having specific preferences, the efficiency loss of
inadequate health plan choice may vary across con-
sumers. Since adequate health plan choice by consumers
is an essential precondition for a successful performance
of health care systems based on managed competition,
understanding the determinants of consumer switching
behaviour and the sensitivity of consumers to the price
and quality of health plans is of crucial importance.
The central aim and main contribution of this paper is to
improve our understanding of consumers’ switching be-
haviour in the context of a health insurance market with
managed competition. We examine the relationship between
individuals’ switching propensity and a variety of consumer,
insurer and health plan characteristics. To this end, we ex-
ploit a rich set of panel data on health plan choice in the
Netherlands over the period 2006–2012, including both
health plan price and quality measures, and a comprehensive
set of individual consumer characteristics, including age,
gender, health status, education level and information on
individual search behaviour. The Netherlands provides an
interesting setting for investigating this, because after a major
health reform in 2006 it is widely perceived as a frontrunner
in implementing managed competition in health care [55].
The paper is structured as follows. In ‘‘Previous find-
ings’’, we briefly discuss the previous literature on deter-
minants of health plan choice. The ‘‘Institutional setting’’
section describes the Dutch institutional setting. The
‘‘Model’’ section sets out the method and the ‘‘Data’’ sec-
tion the data. Estimation results are discussed in ‘‘Results’’
and the ‘‘Discussion and conclusion’’ section concludes.
Previous findings
Most studies about health plan choice are performed in the
context of the US group health insurance market. Outside
the US, most studies on health plan choice are performed in
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, where indi-
viduals have a free choice of insurer during periodic open
enrollment seasons. The various studies show that a variety
of both consumer and health plan characteristics influence
consumer choice and switching behavior.
Health plan characteristics
Empirical studies on health plan choice in the US have all
found that out-of-pocket price is an important determinant
of health plan choice [7, 10, 12, 48, 53]. Many studies found
that consumers are also sensitive to quality differences [3,
13, 21, 33, 36, 49, 59]. Wedig and Taj Seale [59] found that
subjective quality ratings in report cards influence health
plan choices and increased the price elasticity of demand for
health insurance. Beaulieu [3] and Scanlon et al. [49]
showed that enrollees were more likely to avoid plans with a
low quality rating. Jin and Sorensen [33] found that the
dissemination of quality information did have a positive
effect on health plan choice and concluded that this infor-
mation did not simply mirror what was already known.
Dranove and Sfekas [21] showed that, when hospital report
cards provide information that differs from patients’ prior
beliefs, patients tended to shift away from hospitals with
negative news, rather than shifting towards hospitals with
positive news. Dafny and Dranove [13] found that market-
based learning had a larger impact than public report cards
and that the effect of those report cards was entirely driven
by consumer satisfaction scores. Liu et al. [39] found that
low-income parents chose health plans with higher CAHPS
scores for their newly enrolled children. Generally, based
on a review of the literature, Kolstad and Chernew [36]
concluded that the evidence suggests that consumers tended
to choose better-performing health plans and were respon-
sive to initiatives that provided quality information. Kling
et al. [35], however, found evidence of substantial ‘‘com-
parison friction’’, that is the wedge between the availability
of comparative information and consumers’ use of it. They
found that actively providing personalized information was
much more effective than having consumers actively access
information themselves, even when the cost of acquiring
information is small.
In the individual health insurance markets with managed
competition in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland,
consumers have been found to be moderately sensitive to
out-of-pocket price [5, 20, 25, 37, 51, 52, 56]. Schmitz and
Ziebarth [50] showed that a radical change in the premium
structure of German health insurance in 2009 resulted in a
threefold increase in the price elasticity of health insurer
choice and a sixfold increase in individuals’ switching
probability. Their findings suggest that people are very
price sensitive when the reference out-of-pocket price is set
at zero, as in the case of the new German health insurance
1 However, as shown by Handel [28], the welfare effects of
improving health plan choice by consumers are theoretically
ambiguous because it may also exacerbate adverse selection. Whether
improving health plan choice is welfare increasing or decreasing
depends on the market environment. In the Dutch health insurance
market, the potential for adverse selection is limited because
insurance is mandatory for all citizens, the benefits package is
standardized and insurers receive a risk-adjusted capitation payment
in addition to a community rated premium (see ‘‘Institutional setting’’
section). The Dutch risk adjustment scheme is quite sophisticated and
has been substantially improved over the last decade [57]. As
explained by Handel [28], in the case of adequate risk adjustment
adverse selection is effectively constrained, leaving only the positive
effects of improving individual-level choices. Hence, in the Nether-
lands, the positive welfare effects of improving health plan choice are
likely to outweigh the negative effects.
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scheme. Moreover, Frank and Lamiraud [25] found that, in
Swiss local health insurance markets, consumer price
sensitivity declined as the number of choices grew because
a large choice set makes selecting an efficient health plan
more difficult and costly. Wuppermann et al. [60] found the
same for retirees in Germany, who made better choices
when the plan menu was smaller. So far, however, little is
known about the role of quality in health plan choice in
these countries.
Consumer characteristics
Next to health plan characteristics, consumer characteris-
tics also play an important role in the decision-making
process. There is ample empirical evidence from a variety
of countries that younger, male, healthier and higher
educated enrollees are more willing to switch plans [32, 46,
48, 53, 56, 60]. Several studies on health plan choice by
Medicare beneficiaries have found that prices matter for
retirees but substantially less than for active employees
[8–10]. As discussed by Buchmueller et al. [10], the exact
reasons for this result are not clear, but the most likely
explanations are that elderly people may have less cogni-
tive ability to make informed choices and may have less
access to informal sources of information (such as feed-
back from fellow employees) [43]. Studies on health plan
choice in Medicare Part D providing prescription drug
benefits also found that Medicare beneficiaries’ health plan
choices were far from optimal and became worse as
beneficiaries aged, suggesting that elderly people are often
not capable of gathering sufficient information to choose
the cheapest plan that meets their medication needs [1, 30,
61]. Wuppermann et al. [60] found that German retirees
with lower than median education appeared less sensitive
to potential savings from health plan choice than those with
more education.
Research has also shown that search behaviour influences
consumers’ propensity to switch. Consumers who actively
search for quality information increase their capacity to
make better choices and are more likely to switch plans [36].
Finally, consumers’ insurance status matters. In the
Netherlands and Switzerland, consumers with comprehen-
sive supplementary insurance are reluctant to switch plans
because they expect not to be able to obtain equally com-
prehensive supplementary insurance from another insurer
[5, 17, 22]. Since basic and supplementary coverage are
usually sold as a joint product, this implies that consumers
are also less inclined to switch plans for basic insurance.
Furthermore, in the Netherlands, it has also been shown that
having group insurance is likely to have a negative impact
on consumers’ willingness to switch plans because such
contracts are often concluded for several years [40].
Institutional setting
Since the 1990s, the Dutch health care system has been in
transition from supply-side government regulation towards
managed competition [54]. A major step in this transition
process was the introduction of the Health Insurance Act
(HIA) in 2006. The HIA is based on the principles of
managed competition within the context of a national
health insurance system, under which all persons who le-
gally live or work in the Netherlands are obliged to buy, on
an annual basis, a legally defined comprehensive basic
benefit package from a private health insurer, including
primary care, medical specialist and hospital care, and
prescription drugs [24]. With the introduction of the HIA,
people are allowed to switch annually between health in-
surers. Health insurers are obliged to accept all applicants
for the basic benefit package, irrespective of their indi-
vidual risk profile, at a community-rated premium. In ad-
dition to the community-rated premium charged by the
insurer, people have to pay an income-related contribution
to a Risk Equalization Fund (REF), administered by the
government. Expected differences in individual health care
expenditure are equalized by means of risk-adjusted
capitation payments to health insurers from this REF.
Lower-income people are entitled to an income-related
premium subsidy, paid by government out of general tax
revenues. Before 15 November each year, health insurers
are obliged to publish the terms of next year’s insurance
contracts, including next year’s premiums. During a
2-month open enrollment period in December and January,
people are free to choose another contract or another health
insurer.
The basic idea behind the managed competition model
is that consumers put pressure on health insurers to provide
good service and efficient care at a reasonable price. Since
the introduction of the HIA, consumer ratings of the quality
of health insurers have been annually measured and pub-
licly disseminated to facilitate consumer choice. Insurers
are allowed to selectively contract with healthcare provi-
ders and may offer a variety of basic insurance products,
e.g. higher-priced policies offering unrestricted provider
choice and lower-priced policies offering limited provider
choice (preferred provider arrangements or limited provi-
der plans). In practice, however, health insurers hardly used
the opportunity to selectively contract with providers and
to offer limited provider plans [6, 44]. There is a uniform
mandatory deductible that is set annually by the govern-
ment, implying that all people (except children under 18)
have to pay a certain amount of expenses out of pocket
before the insurers start covering expenses (in 2012, this
amount was €220 per year). On top of that, people may opt
for a voluntary deductible at five different levels, from
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€100 up to €500 per year in return for a premium discount.2
In sum, during the study period (2006–2012), basic insur-
ance contracts were highly standardised, primarily varying
in the level of premium and service quality.
Next to individual contracts, insurers are also allowed to
conclude group contracts with any legal entity (e.g. em-
ployers, unions, consumer and patient organizations).
Health insurers are required to offer the same contracts to
individuals and groups but are allowed to offer a group
discount of up to 10 % of the individual rate. At the open
enrolment season, people with a group contract are also free
to choose another individual or group contract offered by
another insurer. Furthermore, in addition to basic insurance,
health insurers are allowed to offer supplementary insurance
products for services not included in the basic benefits
package, among which dental care for adults and physio-
therapy are the most important. In contrast to basic insur-
ance, supplementary insurance is not regulated by the
government (except for solvency requirements). Hence, in-
surers are free to risk-rate premiums and to refuse applicants.
Nevertheless, during our study period. most supplementary
insurance contracts had community-rated premiums or a few
age-rating bands [47]. Although people can buy basic and
supplementary coverage from a different insurer, insurers
actively discourage this by requiring high surcharges on the
premium of supplementary insurance contracts. In practice,
therefore, basic and supplementary insurance are sold as a
joint product. About 85 % of the Dutch population has some
supplementary insurance coverage [44].
Model
In line with other econometric models of health plan choice,
we model individuals’ switching propensity as a function of
health plan and consumer characteristics [2]. We used the
empirical findings on the determinants of health plan choice
(see ‘‘Previous findings’’ section) and the specific features
of the Dutch managed competition setting (see ‘‘Institu-
tional setting’’ section) to model individuals’ switching
behaviour in Dutch health insurance market. Specifically,
we examine the determinants of individuals’ switching
propensity over the period 2006–2012 by using an unbal-
anced panel to estimate the following random effects logit
model in which the decision to switch at the beginning of
year t depends on individual characteristics and the features
in year t of individuals’ health plan in year t - 1:
Pr Switchð Þi;t¼ exp b1Xi;t þ b2Zi;t þ b3Si;t þ cZi;tSi;t
 
1 þ exp b1Xi;t þ b2Zi;t þ b3Si;t þ cZi;tSi;t
   ð1Þ
where Xi,t is the vector of background characteristics of in-
dividual i in year t (age, gender, level of education,
self-perceived health status and insurance status), Zi,t is the
vector of insurer characteristics (premium and quality rating)
in year t of individual i’s health insurer in year t - 1, Si,t is a
dummy variable indicating whether or not individual i in year
t actively searched for information about health plans, and b1,
b2, b3, and c are the associated vectors of coefficients.
3
The dependent variable in our model is the decision of
the respondent to switch health insurer or not. Switching is
defined as switching from one health insurer to another. In
the Dutch health insurance market, several large health
insurance companies offer policies under different labels
(i.e. separate legal entities operating under a different brand
name). Consumers who switch between different labels
from the same health insurance company are also identified
as switchers. In addition, most health insurers (labels) offer
several slightly different basic health insurance policies
(typically a policy offering service benefits and a policy
offering indemnity or cash payments). People opting for
another policy offered by the same insurer are not con-
sidered as switchers in our analysis.
For the independent variables, we have two groups. The
first group consists of the consumer characteristics (X), in-
cluding age, gender, education level, and health status. In
line with previous findings, we expect that the propensity to
switch will be negatively related to age, and positively re-
lated to health status and education level. A higher level of
education is likely to be associated with higher cognitive
skills to compare health plans and therefore with lower
transition costs. This association is supported by several
studies [38, 60]. We also included two variables indicating
whether or not the respondent participated in a group con-
tract or had a supplementary insurance in year t - 1. Both
variables are expected to be negatively correlated with the
propensity to switching in year t. Having supplementary
insurance may reduce people’s switching propensity be-
cause of the complexity of supplementary insurance con-
tracts and because people may fear not to be accepted by
another insurer at the same conditions. The latter may be
particularly true for the elderly and chronically ill [22, 47].
Hence, in addition to having less cognitive ability to make
informed choices, the lower switching propensity of elderly
people may also be caused by fear of being rejected for
supplementary insurance. Participating in a group contract
may reduce people’s switching propensity because of a
premium discount for the group contract or because people
may simply follow the group decisions.
The second group of independent variables consists of
insurer characteristics. As explained above, during the
study period, health insurers primarily distinguished2 In 2012, only 7 % of the insured population opted for a voluntary
deductible, of which about 50 % chose the highest level (€500) and
about 20 % the lowest level (€100) [58]. 3 All models are estimated using STATA 12.0.
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themselves by differences in premium and service quality,
since co-payments (i.e. deductibles) are standardised and
selective contracting was almost absent. Since we aim to
measure the effect of premium and quality on switching
propensity, we include the information on premiums and
quality ratings that is available to consumers during the
2-month open enrollment period (December year t - 1,
January year t) as independent variables. What matters is
how the price and quality of an individual’s health plan
compares to other similar alternatives. Since the benefits
package is standardised and insurers contract with almost
all providers (so consumers can switch insurers without
having to switch providers), all available health plans be-
long to people’s relevant comparison group. Each year,
people can choose among all available health plans, and for
this reason we included all health plan prices and quality
ratings in year t in our estimated model.
The premium variable in our model is the premium for
basic health insurance charged in year t by people’s in-
cumbent insurer in year t – 1.4 By the end of year t - 1,
people can compare all health plan prices in the coming
year (year t) since these prices have ultimately to be an-
nounced by insurers by November 15. Since health plan
premiums usually change each year, we expect that at least
some people compare these prices and may decide that next
year’s premium of their current health insurer relative to
the others makes it worth switching. Hence, we expect that
the premium asked in the next year (t) by the insurer
chosen by an individual in year t - 1 is positively related
to that individual’s propensity to switch in year t.5
The quality variable we included is the rating of people’s
current insurer (in year t - 1) available at the public website
during the open enrollment period. This quality score is
based on consumer ratings of different aspects of insurers’
service quality that are annually collected through a stan-
dardised and validated survey among a representative group
of the insured population (see ‘‘Data’’ section). Although
these quality ratings are measured by a survey among con-
sumers in year t - 1, we have labelled this variable as
quality rating in year t because this information is only
available when people have to choose for a health insurer in
year t. We expect that, if this quality rating adequately re-
flects consumers’ perception and experience of the service
quality of their insurer, people with a low-rated insurer are
more likely to switch than people with a high-rated insurer.6
We are specifically interested in those who actively
search for health plan information because we expect that
these individuals are more inclined to switch. Therefore, in
the survey, we asked people whether they actively searched
for information before deciding to switch (or not).7 To
investigate how people react to consumer information, we
interacted health plan premiums and quality ratings with a
dummy variable (S) indicating whether the individual ac-
tively searched for health plan information. Since Kolstad
and Chernew [36] found that consumers who actively
search for health plan information increased their capacity
to make better choices and were more likely to switch
plans, we expected that people who actively search for
information are more sensitive to price and quality. We
also investigated whether higher educated people who ac-
tively search for information are more likely to switch than
lower educated people, by interacting these variables.8 For
instance, Lave et al. [38] found that higher educated em-
ployees appeared to be more willing to examine the ben-
efits and costs of specific health plans in the US. If
information search has a stronger impact on the switching
propensity of higher educated people, this may indicate
that higher educated people make more effective use of the
available health plan information.
In addition to mandatory basic insurance, about 85 % of
the Dutch population also voluntarily buys supplementary
insurance. Since supplementary insurance products are
highly differentiated, premiums are hard to compare and
we were not able to include a reliable price variable for
supplementary insurance. Van Dijk et al. [56], however,
found that the price elasticity of supplementary insurance
for the most common benefit package was not significant
different from zero. They argued that this was likely due to
the enormous product differentiation making price com-
parisons almost impossible. Frank and Lamiraud [25] and
Wuppermann et al. [60] found that, as the number of health
4 As mentioned before, most health insurers offer several slightly
different basic insurance policies (typically a policy offering service
benefits and a policy offering indemnity or cash payments). Since we
have no data on the actual policy chosen by the respondents, we use
the (unweighted) average premium in cases of more than one policy.
In addition, we also estimated the model including the lowest instead
of the average premium, but this had no significant impact on the
results.
5 In addition to differences in premium levels across health plans,
health plan switching may also be triggered by a change in price of
people’s incumbent insurer (an awareness effect). We therefore also
estimated the effect of a change in price from year t - 1 to year t of
people’s insurer in year t - 1. Since this effect was not significant
and did not improve or alter the estimation results, we did not include
this price variable in the estimated model presented in this paper.
6 We also examined several interaction effects. For instance, by
interacting age and health with quality ratings, we examined whether
older or unhealthy enrolees were more sensitive to quality and thus
more likely to switch if their insurer has a low quality rating. Since
none of these interaction effects were significant., we did not include
the interaction variables in the estimated model presented in this
paper.
7 Notice that we cannot infer from this variable whether seeking
information as such has an impact on switching since people who start
searching for information may be more inclined to switch anyway.
8 This interaction is included in the estimated model, but, for the sake
of simplicity, was not included in the model specification.
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plan choices grew consumer price sensitivity declined.
Based on these findings, we expected that omitting the
price of supplementary insurance may not have a strong
impact on the estimation results.
Finally, we included year-dummies to correct for year-
specific differences. In particular, 2006 was a special year be-
cause of the introduction of the Health Insurance Act, which
made many people reconsider their previous health plan choice.
Data
For this study, we use two different datasets. The first
dataset is constructed using the data of annual surveys
about health plan choice from 2006 to 2012. For each year,
descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 1. Since the
introduction of the new Health Insurance Act in 2006,
surveys were sent out each year to a panel of about 2,000
respondents. Our sample is an unbalanced panel: 19.6 % of
the respondents participated in each of the 6 years, 31.1 %
in only 1 year and the remaining respondents in 2–5 years.
On average, respondents are present for 3.2 years in the
sample. Each year, the survey was sent out in February,
immediately after the 2-month open enrollment period
(December and January). All respondents participated in an
internet-based household panel (http://www.centerdata.nl).
Compared to the Dutch population, our sample is fairly
representative with respect to age, is composed of slightly
fewer respondents with a bad or mediocre self-reported
health status and is slightly more highly educated [11].
As shown in Table 1, the percentage of switchers was
extremely high (26 %) after the introduction of the new
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of survey respondents
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
% of total % of total % of total % of total % of total % of total % of total
n = 2147a n = 2094a n = 1681a n = 1725a n = 1967a n = 1937a n = 1838a
Switching rate
% Switched 26.2 4.5 2.9 3.0 3.9 4.0 4.7
Use of information
Searched for health plan information 93.7 37.5 17.3 35.0 40.3 43.3 45.7
Type of insurance
Group contract 55.6 61.1 66.4 67.7 69.2 70.8 71.6
Individual contract 44.4 38.9 33.6 32.3 30.8 29.2 28.4
Insurance policy
Only basic benefit package 7.0 7.5 8.1 9.3 9.3 8.5 12.1
Supplementary insurance 93.0 92.5 91.9 90.7 90.7 91.5 87.9
Gender
Male 52.1 52.2 53.5 54.8 53.9 53.8 54.0
Female 47.9 47.9 46.5 45.2 46.1 46.2 46.0
Age
18–35 years 24.5 24.2 18.4 16.6 15.7 12.2 9.1
36–50 years 29.3 28.5 25.8 25.3 26.2 25.9 25.5
51–64 years 27.4 28.9 32.4 32.6 34.0 35.1 34.4
65 years and older 18.9 18.4 23.4 25.3 24.2 26.9 31.0
Average age male 51.2 51.8 54.0 54.7 54.5 56.5 57.3
Average age female 46.6 46.3 49.8 51.1 51.2 52.4 54.2
Education
Low and intermediate level 64.6 65.0 65.6 63.2 61.7 60.9 61.3
High level 35.4 35.0 34.4 36.8 38.3 39.1 38.7
Self-reported health status
Bad/mediocre 14.0 14.4 14.9 16.5 15.6 16.3 16.5
Good 58.1 55.4 57.4 55.5 54.9 56.3 53.4
Very good/excellent 27.9 30.2 27.7 28.0 29.5 27.4 30.1
Premium/quality rating
Average monthly premium (SD) 88.3 (2.7) 95.3 (1.4) 91.2 (2.2) 92.9 (3.1) 96.9 (2.7) 103.3 (2.9) 107.6 (3.3)
Average quality rating (SD) 11.7 (3.1) 10.8 (3.3) 10.7 (2.8) 11.3 (2.3) 10.7 (3.1) 11.1 (2.6) 11.2 (2.5)
a n represents the sample size per year. For a few respondents, (some) background characteristics are missing
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Health Insurance Act in 2006, and dropped to about 4 % in
subsequent years. Similarly, the percentage of respondents
searching for information about health insurance dropped
sharply from more than 90 % in 2006 to about 40 % in the
following years. The obvious reason for this is that the
reform of the health insurance market urged people to re-
consider their previous health plan choice because all
health insurance products changed substantially.9
The second dataset is derived from the government web-
site http://www.kiesbeter.nl which publishes comparative
information about price and coverage of health insurance
products and about consumer quality ratings of health plans.
For each health insurer the price of the basic benefit package
is available on this website. As shown in Table 1, the average
monthly out-of-pocket premium per adult increased from
about €88 in 2006 to about €108 in 2012. The drop in average
premium in 2008 can be explained by the introduction of a
mandatory deductible instead of a no-claim rebate.
Quality ratings are based on a standardized and
validated method to measure different aspects of insurers’
quality from a consumer perspective [16, 18]. Each year, a
representative sample of enrolees of each health insurer
fills in a survey with questions how they value their in-
surer’s products and performance [4, 14, 15, 18, 19, 31,
45]. Consumer ratings pertain to two dimensions of in-
surers’ performance. The first dimension includes various
aspects of the service quality provided by the insurer. Six
service items are distinguished: personal approach, provi-
sion of information, telephone responsiveness and assis-
tance by the service desk, completing bills, and the
comprehensibility of the levels of copayments. The second
dimension includes a rating of the health services quality
contracted by health insurers. Consumer ratings with re-
gard to this second dimension of performance hardly dif-
fered across insurers during the study period. Only about 4
of the 31 insurers scored significantly differently from the
average. One obvious reason for this is that during this
period health insurers hardly engaged in selective con-
tracting of health care providers [6], resulting in unre-
stricted provider choice for consumers irrespective of their
choice of health plan. Due to the lack of variation in
consumer ratings with regard to second dimension of in-
surers’ performance (contracted health care quality), we
focused in our analyses exclusively on consumer ratings
with regard to the first dimension (service quality).
On the website, each of the rated service quality items is
presented by a ‘star’ score, indicating whether the insurer
scores below average (1 star), average (2 stars) or above
average (3 stars). Similar to empirical studies on health plan
choice in the US [3, 39], we constructed an aggregated
quality rating based on the scores on the six individual
items. The aggregated quality rating varies between 6 (all
items below average) and 18 (all items above average). We
used the total number of stars for each insurer as a quality
variable. In addition to the star scores, the website also
publishes a general consumer score of health insurers. Since
the aggregated quality rating gives more differentiated in-
sight in the perceived quality difference and displays a
larger variation than the general score, we included only the
aggregated quality rating in our analysis. Table 1 shows the
mean and standard deviation of the aggregated quality rat-
ing (number of stars). On average enrollees have an insur-
ance policy with 11 stars. The variation between insurers
decreased slightly over the years, indicating that differences
in quality ratings between insurers became smaller.
Interestingly, we did not find any correlation between an
insurer’s out-of-pocket premium and quality rating. In each
year of our study period, the correlation coefficient is very
low (on average 0.08, ranging from 0.00 to 0.25) and not
statistically significant different from zero. This implies
that people do not need to make a trade-off between price
and service quality when choosing a health insurer.
Results
Table 2 presents the results of our regression. Since the co-
efficients of logistic regressions give no information on the
magnitude of the impact of the explanatory variables on the
decision whether or not to switch, we also present the mar-
ginal effects to facilitate the interpretation of our findings.
Our findings on the impact of consumer characteristics
on health plan switching are in line with those of previous
studies. As expected, the probability to switch decreases
with age. On average, over the period 2006–2012, a
10-year increase in age leads to a 1.1 %-point decrease in
switching probability relative to a base rate of 5.4 %. To
examine whether switching determinants differ for differ-
ent age groups, we have also split the sample into four
broad age categories. The results are presented in Table 3.
As shown in Table 3, the switching propensity decreases
from about 10 % for the lowest age group (18–35) to about
1.4 % for the highest age group (65?).10
9 Notice, however, that people were not forced to make an active
health plan choice. If they did not make an active choice, they were
automatically enrolled in the default (i.e. most comparable) health
plan issued by their current insurer.
10 In the Netherlands, premium payments start at the age of 18 (until
that age, children do not have to pay a premium because their health
care expenses are paid out of general taxation). Due to this provision,
price sensitivity in this group may be particularly high during their
first open enrollment period. Indeed, we find that the proportion of
switchers is the highest in this particular age group. Since the number
of 18-year-olds in our example is small (comprising only 2.3 % of the
total number of switchers), this does not substantially bias our results.
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The results presented in Table 2 show that, relative to
the base rate, higher educated people have a 1.7 %-point
higher propensity to switch than those with an intermediate
and low level of education. From Table 3, it follows that
education is a primarily important determinant of switching
for the two lowest age groups. In addition, Table 2 shows
that people with a very good/excellent health status have a
2.3 %-point higher chance to switch than people in good
health, who in turn have a 1.0 %-point higher probability to
switch than people with a bad or mediocre health status. As
shown in Table 3, the impact of health on switching is
most prominent within the youngest age group. Further-
more, having supplementary insurance and participating in
a group contract both have a significant negative impact on
people’s propensity to switch health plans (by 1.6 and
2.2 %-points; see Table 2). Table 3 shows that the negative
effect of supplementary insurance on switching particularly
holds for the two highest age groups. This corroborates
findings from earlier studies based on questionnaires that
older and unhealthy people more often do not contemplate
switching because they fear not to be accepted for sup-
plementary insurance [47, 22]. Not surprisingly, people
who indicated that they actively searched for information
about health plans are much more likely to switch (6.1 %-
points). Table 3 shows that this particularly holds for the
lowest age group.11
Table 2 Estimated coefficients
and marginal effects (in %-
points) of the determinants of
the health plan switching over
the period 2006–2012
Coefficients Marginal effectsa
Consumer characteristics
Age (in years)b -0.03*** -1.1
Female 0.07 0.31
High education (compared to low/intermediate) -0.27 1.65
Good health (compared to mediocre/bad health) 0.23 0.98
Excellent health (compared to good health) 0.50*** 2.27
Supplementary insurance -0.34*** -1.56
Group contract -0.52*** -2.23
Searched for health plan information -3.53* 6.11
Insurer characteristics
Monthly premium offer (in t) by insurer (in t - 1) (in euros) 0.02 2.78
Quality rating (in t) of insurer (in t - 1) -0.11*** -0.36
Interaction effects
Education 9 searched for information 0.73*** (See Table 4)
Premium 9 searched for information 0.05*** (See Table 4)
Quality rating 9 searched for information 0.03 (See Table 4)
Year dummies
Year 2007 -2.24*** -6.64
Year 2008 -2.08*** -5.46
Year 2009 -2.25*** -6.02
Year 2010 -2.33*** -6.53
Year 2011 -2.59*** -7.34
Year 2012 -2.78*** -7.61
Constant -1.39
Number of observations 11,598
Number of groups 3570
Baseline switching rate 5.44 %
Intraclass correlation (ICC) 0.059
* p \ 0.10; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.01
a The marginal effects for dummy variables are expressed as the discrete change from the base level (in %-
points). For continuous variables, we estimated the average marginal effect for a one unit change in the
independent variable (see, for example, [41, 42]). Since an average individual does not exist, we computed
the marginal effects as the mean of the marginal effects over each individual [26, 53]
b For age, we estimated the average marginal effect for a 10-unit change (10-year intervals) change in the
independent variable age
11 Notice that, because of the interaction effects, the net impact of
information search on switching is positive.
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Our results on the impact of insurer characteristics on
health plan switching indicate that consumers base their
switching decisions both on price and service quality. As
expected, premium has a significant positive effect on the
propensity to switch. Enrollees of an insurer charging a
relatively high premium are more inclined to switch than
those who are charged a relatively low premium. As shown in
Table 2, a 10 % higher than average monthly premium
(equivalent to about €10), raises the propensity to switch with
2.8 %-point relative to the base rate of 5.4 %. In addition, the
results show that the estimated switching propensity increases
from less than 3 % at a monthly out-of-pocket premium of
€80 to more than 11 % at monthly premium of €110.
We find that consumers are also sensitive to insurers’
service quality as measured by the aggregated quality rat-
ing. As shown in Table 2, the results demonstrate that
enrollees having an insurer with a lower quality rating are
more inclined to switch than enrollees insured with an in-
surer with a high quality rating. A one star higher than
average quality rating, reduces the propensity to switch
with 0.4 %-points relative to the 5.4 % base rate.
Table 3 shows that sensitivity for price and quality differs
across age groups. People in the youngest age group
(18–35 years) appear to be more sensitive to price, whereas the
people in other age groups appear to be more sensitive to quality.
We also find that searching for health plan information
has a stronger impact on peoples’ sensitivity to price than
to service quality. As shown in Table 2, the interaction
between premium and information search is positive and
statistically significant, implying that those who actively
search for information are more inclined to switch when
their insurer charges a high premium next year than those
who do not search for information. As shown in Table 3,
this is particularly the case for people in the lowest age
group. By contrast, the interaction between quality rating
and information search is not statistically significant.
Table 4 shows that the switching propensity of those
who searched for information significantly increases with
Table 3 Estimated coefficients and marginal effects (ME) of the determinants of the health plan switching over the period 2006-2012 for
different age groups
Age groups 18–35 36–50 51–64 65?
Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME Coeff ME
Consumer characteristics
Female -0.01 -0.06 0.21 1.19 0.24 0.91 -0.58 -0.67
High education -1.05** 2.92 -0.44 1.98 0.60 1.67 -1.12 0.28
Good health 0.66 4.53 0.20 1.11 0.12 0.44 0.36 0.43
Excellent health 1.04** 7.23 0.49 2.94 0.26 1.01 0.84 1.30
Supplementary insurance -0.02 -0.15 -0.16 -0.95 -0.50** -2.13 -0.88** -1.31
Group contract -0.67*** -4.44 -0.39** -2.21 -0.44** -1.67 -0.98** -1.12
Searched for information -8.07** 9.06 -1.99 8.48 0.30 5.54 -3.70 1.79
Insurer characteristics
Monthly premium -0.0 4.49 0.05 4.86 0.02 1.03 0.10 2.35
Quality rating -0.08 -0.57 -0.04 -0.42 -0.20** -0.37 -0.41* -0.12
Interaction effects
Education 9 info search 1.64*** a 0.89* a -0.20 a 1.38 a
Premium 9 info search 0.10** a 0.04 a 0.01 a 0.03 a
Quality rating 9 info search -0.01 a -0.05 a 0.11 a 0.31 a
Year dummies
Year 2008 -2.87*** -14.00 -2.37*** -8.97 -1.58*** -4.34 -2.21*** -1.80
Year 2009 -2.28*** -10.28 -2.24*** -7.33 -1.73*** -4.15 -2.77*** -1.54
Year 2010 -2.95*** -11.61 -1.58*** -6.59 -2.13*** -4.85 -4.50*** -2.03
Year 2011 -2.56*** -11.27 -2.49*** -8.81 -1.81*** -4.90 -3.94*** -2.61
Year 2012 -2.50*** -10.90 -3.07*** -10.87 -2.19*** -5.63 -3.50*** -3.44
Constant 0.62 -6.48 -2.77 -8.51
Number of observations 2057 3039 3743 2759
Number of groups 877 1144 1237 879
Baseline switching rate 9.95 % 7.18 % 4.47 % 1,41 %
* p \ 0.10; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.01
a Marginal effects of the interaction effects at the various levels (see Table 4) are available from the authors upon request
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price, from 3.7 % at the lowest out-of-pocket premium
(€80) to 17.2 % at the highest out-of-pocket premium
(€110). By contrast, for those who did not search for in-
formation the switching propensity hardly increases with
price, from 1.5 % at the lowest premium to only 2.4 % at
the highest premium, and this difference is not statistically
significant. As a consequence, the marginal effect of in-
formation search at different premium levels (i.e. the dif-
ference in switching propensities between both groups)
increases from 2.2 %-points at a monthly premium of €80
to 14.8 %-points at a monthly premium of €110 (Table 4,
last column). This implies that switchers who search for
information are more sensitive to price than those who
switch but did not search. This is illustrated by Fig. 1,
which shows that at higher premium levels switching
propensities for those who search for information sig-
nificantly increase, whereas switching propensities for
those who do not search are fairly constant.
The results in Table 4 (last column) also show that the
marginal effect of information search is higher at lower
quality levels, ranging from 3.9 %-point at the highest
quality rating (18 stars) to 8.1 %-point at the lowest quality
rating (6 stars). This suggests that switchers who search for
information are more sensitive to quality than switchers
who do not search. However, since the confidence intervals
overlap for differences in quality up to 5 stars, only large
differences in quality have a distinct impact on the
switching propensity of people who actively search for
Table 4 Marginal effects (ME) of information search at different levels of education, premium and service quality over the period 2006-2012
(in %-points)
Switching propensity in % (95 % CI) ME of information search
(in % points)
Searched for information No information searched
Education 9 searched for information
Low/intermediate education 6.83 (5.78; 7.87) 1.91 (1.31; 2.52) 4.92
High education 9.86 (8.30; 11.42) 1.48 (0.84; 2.13) 8.38
Premium 9 searched for information
€80 3.68 (2.31; 5.05) 1.45 (0.49; 2.41) 2.23
€90 6.49 (5.57; 7.41) 1.73 (1.17; 2.28) 4.76
€100 10.86 (8.88; 12.84) 2.05 (1.30; 2.80) 8.81
€110 17.23 (11.52; 22.94) 2.43 (0.71; 4.15) 14.80
Quality rating 9 searched for information
6 stars 10.94 (8.97; 12.91) 2.89 (1.65; 4.13) 8.05
7 stars 10.24 (8.58; 11.90) 2.61 (1.62; 3.61) 7.63
8 stars 9.57 (8.17; 10.98) 2.36 (1.56; 3.17) 7.21
9 stars 8.95 (7.74; 10.15) 2.14 (1.47; 2.80) 6.81
10 stars 8.35 (7.27; 9.43) 1.93 (1.36; 2.49) 6.42
11 stars 7.79 (6.78; 8.80) 1.74 (1.22; 2.25) 6.05
12 stars 7.26 (6.26; 8.26) 1.57 (1.07; 2.07) 5.69
13 stars 6.76 (5.74; 7.79) 1.41 (0.91; 1.91) 5.35
14 stars 6.30 (5.22; 7.38) 1.27 (0.76; 1.78) 5.03
15 stars 5.86 (4.71; 7.00) 1.14 (0.61; 1.67) 4.72
16 stars 5.44 (4.24; 6.65) 1.03 (0.49; 1.57) 4.41
17 stars 5.06 (3.79; 6.32) 0.92 (0.37; 1.47) 4.14
18 stars 4.69 (3.38; 6.01) 0.83 (0.28; 1.38) 3.86
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Fig. 1 Estimated switching propensities at different premium levels
for people who searched for information and for people who did not,
over the period 2006-2012. The squares indicate the switching
propensity of those who searched for information, and the circles the
switching propensity of those who did not search for information. The
vertical lines indicate the 95 % confidence intervals
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information. The relationship between insurer quality rat-
ings and the switching propensities for both groups is il-
lustrated by Fig. 2.
Figure 2 shows that, at higher quality ratings (the
number of stars), the propensity to switch declines at a
higher rate for those who search than for those who do not,
but that, for small changes in quality, confidence intervals
overlap.
The results presented in Table 4 also show that higher
educated people who searched for information have a 3 %-
point higher (9.9 vs. 6.8 %) switching propensity than
lower educated people who search for information. By
contrast, when people do not search for information,
switching rates do not differ between higher and lower
educated people. This finding suggests that higher educated
people make more effective use from the available infor-
mation than lower educated people.
Finally, as expected, all year dummies relative to 2006
were large and highly significant, reflecting the all-time
high switching rate at the start of the reforms. Since the
context in 2006 differs much from that in 2007 to 2012, we
also tested whether a model over the time period
2007–2012 led to other results. The estimation results for
the period 2007–2012 are included in the ‘‘Appendix’’. The
results show that leaving out 2006 does not substantially
alter the results. Except for the variable excellent health,
both the sign and the magnitude of the estimated coeffi-
cients are quite similar.12
This finding suggests that the introduction of the reforms
merely had an impact on the switching rate but not on its
determinants.
Discussion and conclusion
We find that consumers in the competitive Dutch health
insurance market base their switching decisions not only on
price but also on service quality. Although service quality
matters, publicly available quality information seems to
play a limited role in motivating consumers to switch. This
is because we find that searching for health plan information
significantly increases peoples’ sensitivity to price but not to
quality. Only large differences in quality (exceeding five
stars) seem to have a distinct impact on the switching
propensity of people who actively search for health plan
information. This suggests that published quality ratings
may be of limited use when people decide to switch because
they may know the service quality of their insurer from
experience. Public investments in collecting and dis-
seminating comparative information about health insurers’
service quality may still be worthwhile, however, because it
may improve people’s switching decisions by providing
useful information about the quality of other insurers. In
addition, when health insurers engage in selective con-
tracting and impose restrictions on provider choice—as they
have gradually started to do in the Netherlands since 2012—
the need for comparative information about the performance
of health insurers—especially about the quality of the con-
tracted provider network—is likely to increase.
We also find support of results in previous studies that
the propensity to switch insurers decreases with age, and
increases with education and health status. This may pro-
vide insurers with incentives to focus on accommodating
the preferences of young, well-educated and healthy peo-
ple. We find that young people are more sensitive to price,
whereas older people are more sensitive to quality. Given
that young people are more willing or able to switch, this
preference heterogeneity may be a problem in a managed
competition setting, since insurers may not have sufficient
incentives to invest in high-quality care for the elderly and
chronically ill. In addition, we find that searching for in-
formation has a stronger impact on the switching propen-
sity of higher than lower educated people, suggesting that
higher educated people use available health plan informa-
tion more effectively than lower educated people.
Finally, our results also support earlier findings that
older people having supplementary insurance are less
likely to switch health insurers. As far as this is caused by
negative spillover effects from supplementary insurance
(e.g. more stringent underwriting practices) on consumer
choice in basic health insurance, this may reduce the ef-
fectiveness of managed competition in health care.
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Fig. 2 Estimated switching propensities at different quality ratings
for people who searched for information and for people who did not,
over the period 2006–2012. The squares indicate the switching
propensity of those who searched for information, and the circles the
switching propensity of those who did not search for information. The
vertical lines indicate the 95 % confidence intervals
12 Although the marginal effects of the model including 2006 are
larger, this is mainly due to a difference in base level. Proportional to
the base level, the marginal effects are quite similar.
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A limitation of our research is that it focuses on the
determinants of people’s switching propensity but does not
evaluate the actual choices people made. For instance,
does switching improve people’s health plan choice in
terms of price and quality and how are people making a
trade-off between price and (service) quality? Interest-
ingly, making such a trade-off might not have been nec-
essary in the Dutch health insurance market during our
study period, since we found no correlation between an
insurer’s price and quality rating. Another important
question for further research is whether people who ac-
tively search for information make better choices in terms
of price and quality, and what sources of information they
actually use. Recent empirical findings in the US health
insurance market show that many people do not effec-
tively use the available health plan information [35]. An
answer to these questions may provide an indication of the
effectiveness of the available consumer information about
health plans.
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Appendix: estimation results 2007–2012
See Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5 Estimated coefficients
and marginal effects (in %-
points) of the determinants of
the health plan switching over
the period 2007-2012
Coefficients Marginal effectsa
Consumer characteristics
Age (in years)b -0.03*** -0.62
Female 0.05 0.10
High education (compared to low/intermediate) -0.22 0.53
Good health (compared to mediocre/bad health) 0.06 1.27
Excellent health (compared to good health) 0.18 0.35
Supplementary insurance -0.46** -1.05
Group contract -0.64*** -1.34
Searched for health plan information -3.21 3.86
Insurer characteristics
Monthly premium offer (in t) by insurer (in t - 1) (in euro’s) 0.01 0.80
Quality rating (in t) of insurer (in t - 1) -0.12*** -0.13
Interaction effects
Education 9 searched for information 0.60** (Table 6)
Premium 9 searched for information 0.04* (Table 6)
Quality rating 9 searched for information 0.06 (Table 6)
Year dummies
Year 2008 0.12 0.24
Year 2009 -0.04 -0.08
Year 2010 -0.04 -0.07
Year 2011 -0.20 -0.38
Year 2012 -0.34 -0.61
Constant -2.37
Number of observations 9972
Number of groups 3336
Baseline switching rate 2.08 %
Intraclass correlation (ICC) 0.087
* p \ 0.10; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.01
a The marginal effects for dummy variables are expressed as the discrete change from the base level (in %-
points). For continuous variables, we estimated the average marginal effect for a one-unit change in the
independent variable (see, for example, [41, 42]). Since an average individual does not exist, we computed
the marginal effects as the mean of the marginal effects over each individual [26, 53]
b For age, we estimated the average marginal effect for a ten unit change (10 year intervals) change in the
independent variable age
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